“There is no such thing as sexual morality per se.” That is the proposition set forth in an recent article by Alan H. Goldman, an emeritus professor of philosophy at William and Mary. “Put less dramatically, there is no morality special to sex: no act is wrong simply because of its sexual nature.” Sexual activity, properly understood, is morally neutral. The moral evaluations that pertain to sex are those that pertain to every other field of human activity. “Sex itself is not a moral category, although it places us in relations in which moral considerations apply.” The primary moral consideration is whether sexual conduct is pursued with the rational consent of the participants, which would prohibit rape, sex with minors, and exploitative relationships.
Goldman replies to the objection that casual sex is a form of objectification, an evident violation of Kantian ethics. “In answering this charge, we must admit straight off that sex does involve viewing the other as a sex object: the focus is on the physical body. But this need not involve denial of subjectivity if the other’s desires and interests are taken into account, primarily by requiring rational consent.” Given the sums spent on cosmetics, it would seem that people readily assent to their objectification. “To use another as a means with her consent is perfectly permissible, especially when both parties benefit.”
Sexual desire is unique in that its only motive is to procure pleasure. Reproduction or the expression of emotion are tangential aims. “Overly restrictive sexual ethics derive from definitions that wrongly build these extraneous motives into the concept of proper sex,” Goldman writes. Catholic sexual ethics has traditionally condemned sex outside of marriage even if it is consensual. Secular ethics has tended to forbid sexual relations decoupled from romantic love. The Western tradition going back to Plato has judged sexuality as part of our lower animal natures, a threat to our rational faculties when untethered from love, preferably within the confines of marriage. This prejudice against sexual pleasure has clouded our ethical reasoning. “Sexual desire and love are fundamentally different psychological states,” Goldman writes. “[S]exual desire, although focused on another’s body, is essentially self-regarding, a desire for physical pleasure.” Confusing sex and love should not lead us to conclude “that all sex outside the context of loving commitment is wrong.” Indeed, sex devoid of romantic love can be “intensely pleasurable.”
Traditional Christian sexual ethics takes a rules-based approach, determining the licitness of sexual acts by judging how they accord with the dictates of scripture and natural law. Even more progressive Christian sexual ethics subordinate sexual activity to higher ends such as “commitment” and “mutuality.” Both presume that there is something unique about sexual experience that imparts its own unique moral quality. Professor Goldman’s reflections challenge that consensus.
Lutheran Guilt 